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Abstract
Creating an open society depends on having the proper social ontology. Most often the focus is on individualism and the adoption of market 
social imagery. The result of this strategy is often social divisions and conflict, with many persons lamenting the demise of the common good. 
But this vacillation between the individual and the collective overlooks a source of order--referred to by Martin Buber as the in-between--that 
is compatible with generating an open society. As a result of this omission, most proposals for an open society lack vitality and a creative vision.
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Introduction
Social critics have been enthralled by the prospects of 
developing an “open society” ever since Popper (1963) pub-
lished his book with this title. But in many countries around 
the world nowadays, particularly those that have recently 
freed themselves from repressive regimes, this idea is much 
more than a theoretical issue. In Eastern Europe, for exam-
ple, this theme has captivated many persons during the past 
twenty years or so. The aim of these societies is breathe the air 
of freedom and become increasingly open. In many respects, 
their escape from the past is predicated on the realization of 
this openness.
The aim of socialist societies, such as the Soviet Union, 
was to overcome the class conflict, exploitation, and aliena-
tion associated with capitalism, and gradually create a more 
commodious environment. These societies, in short, want-
ed to establish as sense of solidarity as a normal condition. 
Many of these places, however, adopted an abstract model of 
collectivity. To borrow from Camus, this model represented 
a metaphysical singularly that, in the end, demanded uni-
formity and the related compliance. This mode of solidarity, 
furthermore, often undermined the high ideals that were es-
poused.
The problem, however, is that there is some confusion 
about the nature of an open society. In some cases, the idea 
is that in such a society persons are guaranteed almost un-
limited freedom. Along with this misconception is that cul-
tural mores and traditions tend to restrict persons and thus 
the influence of these elements must be reduced. Persons are 
thus encouraged to be skeptical of all planned institutions 
and other intentional ventures, especially those that may em-
phasize social responsibility. The only acceptable method of 
organizing an open society, accordingly, is through the op-
eration of markets. After all, these devices regulate persons 
without imposing an ideology.
Bergson provides some insight into this trend, although 
Popper did not think favorably of his analysis. In his Two 
Sources (1977, p. 282), Bergson summarizes the differences 
between an open and closed society. A closed society, for ex-
ample, is predicated on authority and hierarchy, while one 
that is open stresses liberty and inclusiveness. In the second 
option, persons are free from imposed obligations and en-
couraged to offer criticisms.
Nonetheless, this formula has not produced the paradise 
that was promised. In the case of Eastern Europe, there is no 
doubt that liberation from the Soviet Union has produced 
some positive results. Personal expression has increased, 
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along with the commercial side of life. But even a cursory 
examination reveals that these places have experienced the 
dark side of the market, or what Hinkelammert (1991) calls 
“savage capitalism.” As a result change proliferates, along 
with conflict and uncertainty, as unemployment soars and 
deep social divisions are revealed. In fact, in the aftermath 
of relying on the market to promote prosperity, solidarity is 
often dismissed as a harmful dream.
But is an open society worth pursuing? Indeed, hard-
ly anyone would dismiss this idea out of hand. A closed or 
repressive order, almost by definition, is not very appealing. 
Nonetheless, the development of an open society has not 
necessarily had an auspicious beginning in many countries, 
such as Lithuania. Social fragmentation and strife are not 
very favorable traits. If an open society is still desired, how-
ever, perhaps some serious reflection on this issue should be 
entertained. In this way, some of the miscues that have oc-
curred can be corrected.
But what may also happen is that the original image of 
an open society held by persons in these countries may have 
to be abandoned. The rendition of freedom that has been ex-
tolled, for example, may come to be viewed as untenable in 
both theory and practice. In this regard, a truly open society 
may not be compatible with market regulation. Cutting jobs 
to increase profitability may become an unsavory proposal. 
In this regard, a society may be open when the communal 
nature of social life is recognized. In other words, there is no 
way to know ahead of time where this reflection will lead. 
Still many persons would agree that the current image of an 
open society is problematic.
The Liberal Tradition
Those who covet an open society are often influenced by 
the liberal tradition of political philosophy. At the core of this 
perspective is the work of Mill, Locke, and, more recently, 
Hayek. As is well known, the centerpiece of this outlook is 
the individual. While referring to Locke, the individual is 
sovereign. 
In this sense, Popper (1977, Vol. 2, 91) praises the benefits 
of Mills’ psychologism, particularly the opposition to holism 
or collectivism. Along with Mill, Popper insists that the be-
havior of any group reflects nothing more than the actions of 
individuals. Nonetheless, Mills disappoints Popper by trying 
to provide universal rules of behavior.
With respect to the Medieval Period – the backdrop of 
the ruminations of Mill and Locke – the liberal position 
appears to be quite enlightened (Hinkelammert, 2002a, pp. 
48–50) Persons are no longer subservient to arcane cosmic 
themes, religions dogmas, or questionable social hierarchies. 
Now everyone is free to reflect and act in a rational manner. 
The social status attained by persons, accordingly, depends 
on their goals and ambition. Additionally, customs and other 
institutional barriers are characterized as anathema to this 
freedom.
Persons are thus encouraged to care for themselves and 
pursue their respective aims. For this reason, personal re-
sponsibility is very important, along with the dignity that is 
attached to the individuals. No-one should be allowed to vio-
late the rights of others, even the government.
But soon a problem begins to arise. Specifically, how 
does social order develop? The liberal tradition, in this sense, 
shares a bias that is present in various other theories and dif-
ficult to overcome. The assumption is that persons are basi-
cally a-social, but must somehow become part of a coherent 
unit. At least in the work of Mill and Lock, in contrast to 
Hobbes, persons are not totally blinded by self-interest and 
in constant need to supervision. Consequently, a version of 
order is enacted that is not necessarily synonymous with re-
pression.
Due to their ability to reflect, persons can appreciate the 
need to include others in their plans. In effect, given the at-
tention directed to individuals, social life could be quite 
chaotic. For example, persons might begin to achieve their 
own goals at the expense of others. The result of the freedom 
granted to individuals could be conflict and uncertainty.
In the case of Mills and Locke, persons can see the wis-
dom of tempering their freedom. In order to insure tranquili-
ty, they are all expected to relinquish some of their sovereign-
ty to the state (Waldron, 1989). The government, accordingly, 
mediates all relationships and guarantees order. But this in-
tervention should be minimal, since individuals are still pre-
sumed to be autonomous.
As a result of this maneuver, associations are thought to 
be basically contractual (Hinkelammert, 2002a, pp. 80-81). 
Certain rules are outlined, and legitimized and enforced by 
the government, which guide all interaction. Nonetheless, the 
key shortcoming is this strategy is that persons do not neces-
sarily view themselves to be truly connected. Consequently, 
their relationships are mostly tactical and designed to meet 
the letter of the law. In actuality, these rules are treated often 
as an imposition to be circumvented, if the possibility arises.
The result is a society where persons revel in their own 
needs and exhibit little or no social solidarity. Indeed, any 
talk of community responsibility is met with dismay or re-
sistance, because basically persons are encouraged to pur-
sue their own goals and achieve individual happiness (Hin-
kelammert, 2002b). Any connection to others is ancillary to 
these aims.
At first, however, the freedom offered by the liberal tra-
dition is quire alluring. Personal ambitions are elevated in 
importance, with minimal interference from others or out-
side forces. Enjoyment, comfort, and consumption become 
key themes, while sacrifice and community are pushed into 
the background. What could be more enticing? Nonetheless, 
societies that view openness in this way are very lonely plac-
es, where the pursuit of success often promotes internecine 
rivalries and culminates in widespread alienation. As persons 
become increasingly self-absorbed, social issues become a 
burden and are ignored.
Market Imagery
In many countries, the correct operation of markets is 
thought to be synonymous with the development of an open 
society. In fact, this is the argument advanced by Hayek. Lais-
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sez-faire economics, accordingly, is viewed as the best vehi-
cle to bring an open society to fruition. But due to this em-
phasis, any talk about collectivism is criticized as leading to 
inefficiency and oppression. The term popularized by Hayek 
(1944) in this regard is serfdom. 
Many places in Eastern Europe adhere to this position 
and have adopted the neo-liberal model of economic and 
social life. Similar to the liberal tradition, the individual is 
supreme. In this updated rendition, however, another step is 
taken. Specifically, the person is treated as an atom.
According to Mill and Locke, persons are aware of others 
and, eventually, engage in tactical relationships. Such asso-
ciations may even morph into cooperation, although short-
lived. In the case of neo-liberalism, however, such insight 
is dismissed as a distraction. Reminiscent of the statement 
made by Margaret Thatcher, society does not exist in this the-
ory; in the neo-liberal philosophy, social order is a collection 
of individuals and their familial associates.
In the neo-liberal version of the world, persons are com-
petitors or adversaries. They are expected to pursue their 
preferences, with no regard for the impact of their behavior 
on others. How order emerges from this maelstrom is spec-
ified by the market. In an almost magical but perverse way, 
personal greed promotes the common weal. In this sense, 
Adam Smith described the market to be guided by an invisi-
ble but steady hand.
Within this neo-liberal framework, the market is given 
the latitude to regulate behavior. But this control is not intru-
sive. After all, the market is based on rationality and exhibits 
no biases; the market, as conservatives are fond of saying, is 
non-ideological. What this device does, accordingly, is allow 
the best ideas or products to emerge from the competition 
that is fostered. Advocates of laissez-faire contend that every 
facet of social life would be improved by the discipline intro-
duced by this process (Harvey, 2005).
When regulated in this manner, society becomes a battle-
ground. At the marketplace certain persons triumph, while 
others lose and try to regroup. But the battle that ensues is 
downplayed, due to the mediation by the market. There is 
nothing diabolical or tragic about this conflict, since the ra-
tionality that guides the marketplace is designed to improve 
efficiency and thus upgrade society. Any job losses or per-
sonal hardships will be balanced by higher productivity and 
lower process. The overall calculus of happiness, accordingly, 
will show positive gains.
Persons are thus ultimately free at the market place. Any 
misbehavior will be detected by the market and corrected. If 
one gambit fails, try another. As Milton Frieman once noted, 
the only moral principle that is operative at the marketplace 
is profitability. Any other sentiment that might be exhibited, 
in fact, only detracts from the rationality that is the keystone 
of the market. Failure to pursue personal gain, therefore, rep-
resents irresponsible behavior.
According to this thesis, writes Hinkelammert (1984, pp. 
77–118), society can best be described as a “total market.” 
Persons are free, therefore, to experience losses and gains, 
and should expect little more than an analytical appraisal of 
these outcomes. Good traders at the marketplace, for exam-
ple, should be able to identify risky stocks, so that they do 
not squander their retirements. If they lose their life savings, 
their decisions were obviously faulty and should have been 
punished. Furthermore, emotional responses to these trage-
dies encourage faulty thinking and are unproductive.
The neo-liberal world is thus far worse than lonely. When 
society is characterized as a market, life is downright hostile. 
Persons and groups are treated as causalities of an economic 
rationality that is unrelenting but fair. Persons get what they 
deserve! But as more persons are harmed, the mantra is that 
this pain will result in a better economy in the future. In the 
absence of any immediate fanfare, any of the so-called struc-
tural changes that result are touted to be beneficial in the 
long-term. In many ways, this entire operation is tautological 
and mysterious, and hardly corresponds to the scientific im-
age associated regularly with neo-liberalism.
But when an open society is equated with the operation 
of markets, freedom is purchased at a high price. Progress is 
associated with economic growth—which often has little to 
do with the overall well-being of a society—while everything 
pales in comparison. Persons may learn to live with the pain 
inflicted by the market, but the quality of life suffers because 
social support is eviscerated. Indeed, mutual support would 
be an irrational response at the marketplace. Persons are thus 
left to navigate a world of suspicion, damaged lives, and faux 
relationships, with everyone jockeying for advantage and 
recognition. Some time ago, Erich Fromm (1955, pp. 67–77) 
labeled such a society sick.
A Faulty Freedom
Both the liberal and neo-liberal positions are based on a 
faulty premise. That is, persons are portrayed to be funda-
mentally a-social and thus can flourish only as individuals. 
Any call for social responsibility, accordingly, represents an 
unnecessary imposition or something worse, namely the in-
troduction of a totalitarian system. In this situation, a society 
that pursues openness is left in a serious quandary.
The crux of this issue is that both of these traditions ad-
here to the standard paradigm adopted by social philoso-
phers. On the one hand, the focus can be the individual. This 
position is referred to usually as nominalism. Because the 
individual is reduced to an atom, the social realm is treated 
as an aberration or illusion. The key consideration is simply 
individual initiative and the realization of personal goals. At 
best, as described by Hayek (1973), social order arises spon-
taneously and is unrelated to collective intentions.
Freedom, in this case, is envisioned to be absolute. The 
reason behind this claim is that persons are atoms. And when 
conceived in this limited way, freedom is exercised in a vacu-
um. In other words, each atom can be actualized without any 
regard for others because they are not connected. According 
to this scenario, due to the independence of atoms, others 
are simply unknown and irrelevant. As a result, the arrival of 
order can only be mysterious. 
The other traditional position is advanced by realists. 
These writers argue that the society should not be depicted 
as the result of individual action or even a gaggle of persons. 
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These realists claim that a community exists sui generis, and 
thus has the duty to control persons. In this sense, the social 
is considered to be ontologically superior to the individual. 
Moreover, without this exalted reality order would devolve 
into a cacophony of viewpoints.
In terms of realism, therefore, freedom can only be envi-
sioned by the collective. But in order to experience this lib-
erty, persons must be subservient to this ultimate or higher 
reality. The result of this demand is totalitarianism, whereby 
persons are sacrificed to the group. In the end, they are free 
but overshadowed by a more powerful source of order.
When those who pursue an open society do not break 
with this paradigm, they tend to vacillate between two ex-
tremes. Either they focus on the individual, and champion 
a laissez-faire position, or desire solidarity but fear the ac-
companying totalitarianism. Neither option is very satis-
fying.
According to the liberal and neo-liberal traditions, free-
dom is idealized. In both theories, persons act with minimal 
regard for others. But when relief is sought from this condi-
tion, the only option is an imposing collective that has the 
latitude to usurp individual rights. Such a dead end does not 
bode well for the promotion of an open society.
A Critical Blind Spot
A serious blind spot is present in both nominalism and 
realism. Stated simply, in each theory the world is portrayed 
in a very abstract way. All that exists is the individual or the 
collective. What is overlooked, however, is the “space” that 
exists between these two poles. Martin Buber (1965) refers 
to this realm as the “in-between,” although a host of writers 
have proposed additional descriptives. Their point is that nei-
ther nominalism nor realism captures adequately how social 
order is actually engendered.
Both positions are sustained by a dualism that many 
modern writers consider to be outmoded. Simply put, indi-
viduals are not atoms that are separated categorically, nor are 
collectives distinct from individuals. Such distinctions mere-
ly recapitulate divisions – between part and whole or par-
ticular and general – that are not treated as cogent by many 
modern writers.
Clearly persons are open to others and are not atoms. 
Jean-Luc Nancy (2000) describes this new situation as “be-
ing singular plural.” In other words, individuals have unique 
identities but always exist with others, that is, inter-subjec-
tively. They are never isolates but share an existential space. 
Their uniqueness, in fact, emerges in contract to others.
The collective, likewise, is not something abstract, cut off 
from human action (Dussel, 1988). This whole does not tran-
scend individuals, like some ethereal entity, but is revealed at 
the nexus of persons. In this sense, the collective is not some-
thing foreign, i.e., ontologically separate, that can, at times, 
be superimposed on individuals to insure order.
The thrust of “being singular plural” is that persons are 
primordially connected to one another, before a contract 
is created to establish regularity. Indeed, this connection 
permits a contract to be proposed and implemented. The 
basic condition of persons, accordingly, is their togeth-
erness  – not based on similarity but their differences. As 
Niklas Luhmann (1982) describes this situation, order is 
engendered and held together through recognition that 
unites differences. But this relationship exists prior to any 
formal acknowledgement.
The rendition of an open society that is predicated on 
“being singular plural” offers a new perspective on freedom, 
one that makes sense. Openness, for example, is not equat-
ed with absolute freedom or anathema to social solidarity. 
Now persons are understood to act always in the presence 
of others, and this relationship determines the validity of 
all behavior. In this regard, declares Levinas (1968), ethics 
precedes ontology. This relationship to others, for example, 
challenges the idea that persons should be sacrificed to any 
abstraction, such as profit. After all, how can a dignified re-
lationship be maintained with others in view of such manip-
ulation?
An open society, therefore, does not necessarily require 
unlimited freedom; such a position, in fact, is a myth. But 
on the other hand, the desire for solidarity does not signal 
automatically the curtailment of liberty. Within the realm of 
the in-between, freedom is worked out among equal partic-
ipants. In this dialogical space, the boundary that both sep-
arates and joins persons is negotiated in a way that protects 
everyone. With respect to maintaining their dignity, could 
the desire for profitability survive this test?
In this version of an open society, the uniqueness of 
persons is cultivated but not at the expense of others. And 
because this basic condition of existence constitutes a com-
munity, mutual aid does not signal an end to personal integ-
rity. Existing in the face of others, notes Levinas, invites care 
rather than subservience. In reality, no-one in this dialogical 
community has the stature to demand such an undignified 
outcome.
Conclusion
Rather than beginning from the liberal tradition, and 
likely adopting eventually the neo-liberal perspective, those 
who desire an open society might try a different tact. Guided 
by the principle of “being singular plural”, openness might be 
more productively conceived as inter-subjective. What could 
be avoided, accordingly, are the rampant individualism and 
fear of collectivity that are found nowadays in many societies 
where openness is extolled. A more commodious order could 
thus be established, whereby solidarity and mutual care can 
be expected without the sacrifice of personal uniqueness and 
initiative.
After all, in view of the work of Nancy and many others, 
a sense of community is never imposed on persons. Rath-
er than something rare, and likely dangerous, persons are 
never removed from others. Their fundamental condition is 
communal, without any formal designation as a community. 
Starting from this position could establish a more authentic 
framework for developing an open society than is currently 
the case. A society is thus possible that is both open and sup-
portive.
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